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1. Horizon1 is a Research Institute at The University of Nottingham and a Research 
Hub within the UKRI Digital Economy programme2. Horizon brings together 
researchers from a broad range of disciplines to investigate the opportunities 
and challenges arising from the increased use of digital technology in our 
everyday lives. Prof. McAuley is Director of Horizon and was principal 
investigator on the ESRC funded CaSMa3 (Citizen-centric approaches to Social 
Media analysis) project to promote ways for individuals to control their data and 
online privacy, and the EPSRC funded UnBias4 (Emancipating Users Against 
Algorithmic Biases for a Trusted Digital Economy) project for raising user 
awareness and agency when using algorithmic services. Dr Koene was a lead 
researcher of the CaSMa and UnBias projects, is Research co-Investigator on the 
EPSRC funded ReEnTrust5 (Rebuilding and Enhancing Trust in Algorithms) 
project and chairs the working group for developing the IEEE P7003 Standard for 
Algorithm Bias Considerations. Dr Jiahong Chen is a Researcher Fellow of 
Horizon, with his completed doctoral research focusing on the legal and societal 
implications of online advertising.
Questions
General
1. How has digital technology changed the way that democracy works in 
the UK and has this been a net positive or negative effect?
2. The implications of digital technologies on democracy in the UK are multi-
dimensional. On the one hand, the popularity of online services and platforms 
has enabled the government, political parties, individual politicians, and civil 
society organisations to reach out to the general public in highly effective 
manners. These include the use of online government portals, electronic 
archives, social media channels and direct communications. On the other hand, 
the press, watchdogs, and rights groups have gained better access to 
information whereby public bodies can be subject to closer oversight and greater 
transparency. Members of the public are also empowered to engage in public 
debates more easily, and can even hold public officials accountable by means of 
1 http://www.horizon.ac.uk




2“citizen journalism” on social media.
3. However, digital technologies have also posed unprecedented challenges to the 
discourse of democracy. As further explained in the responses below, new forms 
of communications may be exploited to undermine the functioning of democracy, 
notably hampering public debates, manipulating voters, and creating cyber-
polarisation. While it is hard to measure the net effect of digital technologies, 
appropriate regulatory efforts can minimise the potential harms of such 
technologies.
2. How have the design of algorithms used by social media platforms 
shaped democratic debate? To what extent should there be greater 
accountability for the design of these algorithms?
4. The design of algorithms used by social media platforms has, at least until 
recently, not been guided by any direct considerations regarding democratic 
debate. The primary guiding principle has been to increase the competitive 
market share of the platforms as measured in size of user-base, time spent on 
the platforms, number of interactions (“likes”, “shares”, “ad-clicks” etc). In order 
to achieve competitive advantage, the algorithms have been built to play on 
same basic human behavioural and emotional triggers that tabloid journalism 
and political propaganda have traditionally prayed on, sensationalism, outrage, 
and strong emotions. An unintended by-product of this development has been 
an increased visibility in confrontational media content focusing on polarisation 
of democratic debate.
5. In the absence of laws or regulations governing the quality or tone of online 
discourse, platforms have tended to want to protect the neutrality of their own 
political position, to avoid alienating any part of their potential user base, by 
appealing to crowd based mechanisms (e.g. user driven “like” counts) for 
identifying which content to promote. As is well know from many studies of 
crowd behaviour however, nobody is morally responsible or accountable for the 
behaviour of a crowd.
6. In order to mitigate against unacceptable behaviour on online platforms it is vital 
to establish clear lines of accountability that cannot vanish in the crowd. Since 
the platform provider is the only party with the capacity to know what is 
happening on the platform, accountability must lie with the platform provider.
Education
3. What role should every stage of education play in helping to create a 
healthy, active, digitally literate democracy?
7. Helping to create a healthy, active democracy is a core function of the 
educational system that should include every stage of education and must go 
beyond the focus on digital literacy. The focus of concerns about mis-information 
and dis-information is on digital platforms because digital is the main conduit 
through which information is disseminated. Fundamental skills of critical analysis 
and distinguishing serious democratic debate from populist crowd baiting, 
however are not specific to the medium through which the information is carried. 
Digital literacy can help educate people to understand the process that 
channelled certain information to them. Being able to engage in a healthy 
democratic discussion, to listen to opposing points of view and evaluate the 
positions based on their merits, however requires an education focusing on 
3human social dynamics, not technology.
Online campaigning
4. Would greater transparency in the online spending and campaigning 
of political groups improve the electoral process in the UK by ensuring 
accountability, and if so what should this transparency look like?
8. Greater transparency on online campaigning by political groups would help 
address some of the threats to democracy in the UK. To effectively hold political 
campaigns to account, however, future regulation should not only focus on 
spending, but also the use of targeting technologies and personal data of the 
electorate. In fact, restrictions on the use of personal data – including data 
revealing one’s political opinions – are already in place under data protection 
law.6 Policymakers should further investigate how data protection principles 
should apply to political campaigning. For example, further legislation may be 
introduced to empower electoral regulators to issue a code of practice to define 
what constitutes a legitimate interest by campaign groups (and is thus 
permissible even without securing individual consent) and what constitutes 
unfair practices (and is thus prohibited regardless of individual consent).
9. An effective regime designed to enhance transparency in online political 
campaigning should cover at least the following areas: (1) a requirement of a 
detailed statement on the political group’s spend on different online platforms 
and the marketing methods employed; (2) a compulsory, publicly accessible 
archive of any online political advertisements and direct-marking messages to 
internet users and the criteria of targeting; (3) a platform-specific – or ideally, 
cross-platform – portal to allow internet users to review when and how they 
have been targeted with political messages and by which political groups.
5. What effect does online targeted advertising have on the political 
process, and what effects could it have in the future? Should there be 
additional regulation of political advertising?
10. Online targeted advertising may exhibit its negative effects on the political 
process at least in the following three ways:
11. First, it may create chilling effects on internet users who are conscious of 
online tracking enabled by online advertising practices, and thus subject to “self-
censorship” when expressing their opinions online.7
12. Second, political campaigners may gain unfair advantages through opaque 
targeting practices, which can be highly powerful yet hard to trace.8 This may 
include using protected characteristics to identify and influence susceptible 
groups or disseminating false claims about opposition groups that are hard to 
noticed and corrected by the latter.
13. Third, targeted advertising may also deepen social division by generating 
“filter bubbles” that polarise voters. There is a substantial risk that voters may 
be exposed to political messages from limited sources and thus lose sight of the 
full landscape of the political discourse.9
6 See DPA 2018, sec 10; sch 1, para 22; GDPR, art 9(1).
7 For empirical evidence, see https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989092
8 Cambridge Analytica, for example, has been accused of unduly influencing voters in the UK’s Brexit 
Referendum. See https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-43558876
9 See, for example, 
4Privacy and anonymity
6. To what extent does increasing use of encrypted messaging and 
private groups present a challenge to the democratic process?
14. Encrypted messaging and private groups are sometimes considered to 
have facilitated the dissemination of harmful content and mis-/disinformation by 
making such abuses more difficult to regulate. However, strong encryption also 
plays an important role in improving confidentiality of communications and has a 
positive impact on user trust, which forms an important part of the foundation of 
a democratic society.10
15. Private groups (like WhatsApp), that are not already politically 
homogenous, tend to have a more discourse-oriented character compared to the 
more information-dissemination focused character of open platforms (like 
Twitter). The quality of debate on private group platforms therefore depends on 
the general (technology-independent) capacity towards democratic discourse. 
The use of encrypted messaging and private groups by political groups tends to 
focus on organising of their followers. Political campaigning is not directly done 
on these platforms.
16. In most widely available end-to-end encrypted systems, the platform 
provider also supplies the app that decrypts the data and presents it to the user. 
It is often overlooked, yet entirely reasonable, that such apps could be 
implementing some of controls mandated on “the platform” after the data has 
been decrypted, and in a manner that limits the privacy impact.
7. What are the positive or negative effects of anonymity on online 
democratic discourse?
17. Online anonymity has the positive effect of encouraging individual 
participation in the public discussion in the online forum, potentially facilitating 
public engagement in a democratic process. However, anonymity also means 
lower costs for publishing inappropriate, manipulative, offensive or even illegal 
content, and higher costs for enforcement against such behaviour.11
18. Despite the potential downsides of maintaining full anonymity online, 
policymakers should take additional caution when considering any “real-name” 
policy or the like. Such an approach may present significant threats to 
confidentiality of electronic communications, and create substantial chilling 
effects to the use of online services.12 Bad-actors are likely to circumvent the 
“real-name” policy with false identities, whereas the “real-name” policy could 











58. To what extent does social media negatively shape public debate, 
either through encouraging polarisation or through abuse deterring 
individuals from engaging in public life?
19. See response to Q2.
9. To what extent do you think that there are those who are using social 
media to attempt to undermine trust in the democratic process and in 
democratic institutions; and what might be the best ways to combat this 
and strengthen faith in democracy?
20. See work by Carole Cadwalladr, extensively published in The Observer 
and The Guardian for evidence regarding the use of social media to attempt to 
undermine trust in the democratic process.
The best ways to combat this and strengthen faith in democracy are for actual 
politicians and serious journalists to refrain from engaging in the same 
disingenuous activities.
Misinformation
10. What might be the best ways of reducing the effects of 
misinformation on social media platforms?
21. See response to Q3.
Moderation
11. How could the moderation processes of large technology companies 
be improved to better tackle abuse and misinformation, as well as 
helping public debate flourish?
22. No response.
Technology and democratic engagement
12. How could the Government better support the positive work of civil 
society organisations using technology to facilitate engagement with 
democratic processes?
23. Government departments could support civil society organisations by 
further streamlining and accelerating the response process to freedom of 
information requests and provide access to (public) government data in 
standardised and compatible formats.
13. How can elected representatives use technology to engage with the 
public in local and national decision making? What can Parliament and 
Government do to better use technology to support democratic 
engagement and ensure the efficacy of the democratic process?
24. No platform provides a representative sample of the population (for 
example, few privacy advocates will be found on Facebook), and care should be 
taken in extrapolating policy from such biased statistical samples. The 
introduction of any technological engagement means must be accompanied by a 
suitable impact assessment to ensure inclusivity, and that it does not 
systematically favour some demographic groups over others. Much evidence has 
6previously been received on this topic in the previous 2014 Select Committee 
inquiry into “Social media data and real time analytics”.13
14. What positive examples are there of technology being used to 
enhance democracy?
25. Audrey Tang’s work as Digital Minister in Taiwan has introduced a series 
of technological innovations to increase citizen engagement with government, 




14 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G0v; https://apolitical.co/solution_article/reprogramming-power-audrey-
tang-is-bringing-hacker-culture-to-the-state/ 
